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ABSTRACT 
Humanitarian aid operations are a social and interactive enterprise among a 
variety of international partners.  There are currently many initiatives that attempt to 
enhance collaboration between United States Government Agencies, foreign 
governments, international government organizations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and private volunteer organizations.  The diverse nature of organizations and 
numbers of groups involved in a complex humanitarian emergency is extraordinary.  
Participants must understand there are multiple factors that impact the collaborative 
capacity of groups in humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.  They need to 
understand that some NGOs will work with the military and some will not.  Military 
forces must respect NGO needs for independence, neutrality, transparency, and 
impartiality.  However, when actors can come to an agreement regarding contact within 
these environments the sum of their efforts will be greater than their individual 
contributions.  Face-to-face contact is crucial in enhancing collaborative capacity.  
Individuals build trust through face-to-face contacts which can translate to more frequent 
contact using other less personal or social modes of communication.  Collaboration is an 
iterative process.  Participants must build collaborative capacity over time by focusing on 
developing swift trust and be aware of cultural understanding.  Participants must also use 
face-to-face contact at the initial meeting.  After swift trust is established, participants can 
use media of decreasing richness over time, but should schedule face-to-face meetings to 
ensure collaboration is maintained.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Humanitarian aid operations are intensely social and interactive among a variety 
of international partners.  There are currently many initiatives that attempt to enhance 
collaboration between the United States military and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  The diverse nature of organizations and numbers of groups involved in a 
complex humanitarian emergency is extraordinary.  Generally, the central government is 
the authority within the country, but military units and NGOs all work together in the 
same geographical space.  However, the boundaries that separate the groups are not 
geographic but structural and relational.  The author uses Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen’s 
definition of collaborative capacity as “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, 
and sustain interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes.”1  
Collaboration allows groups to accomplish what individuals alone cannot and it prevents 
duplication of individual or organizational efforts.  Collaboration is most beneficial when 
organizations are interdependent and rely on each other to achieve a common goal or task.2 
Finally, interorganizational reliance provides an opportunity for organizations to coordinate 
their work and find ways to work well with one another.3  Virtual collaborative networks 
are networks where individuals rely on information technology to mediate traditional 
geographical and temporal boundaries of an organization. The result is a “company 
without walls” that operates as a virtual “collaborative network of people,” independent 
                                                 
1 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacities: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Innovations through Collaboration, Advances in 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams 12 (2006): 256. 
2 Tammy A. Rinehart, Anna T. Laszlo and Gwen O. Briscoe, COPS Collaboration Toolkit: How to 
Build, Fix and Sustain Productive Partnerships (Washington, D.C.: Office Of Community Oriented Police 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001): 6. www.hsdl.org/homsec/docs.justice/nps18-053105-07.pdf. 
3 Gail Fann Thomas, Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen.  A Diagnostic Approach To Building 
Collaborative Capacity In An Interagency Context.  (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 
25, 2006): 2. 
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of location or affiliation.4  A virtual collaborative network is a network that operates 
across space, time, and organizational borders by webs of communication technologies.5 
A method to encourage collaboration is to use the flexibility of the internet to 
communicate and share information virtually.  The concept of virtual implies interfaces 
and boundaries; project teams that rapidly form, reorganize, and dissolve when the needs 
of a dynamic marketplace change; and individuals with differing competencies who are 
located across time, space, and cultures.6  For the first time, the internet provides a 
framework to enable full collaboration between geographically dispersed participants.7  
This is highly attractive because of the distributed nature of operations in humanitarian 
aid and disaster response operations.  Virtual networks are groups of geographically 
dispersed organizational members who communicate and carry out their activities 
through information technology. 8  Virtual collaborative networks can leverage the 
communicative and interconnective capability of the internet enhancing the efficiency 
and harmonizing HADR groups.  Virtual collaborative networks are an attractive method 
to harmonize the efforts of all of the groups in a natural disaster.  These virtual 
connections tie people together for effective information exchange and communications 
among the US military, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and 
security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector 
involved in stability operations.9  Virtual collaborative networks add a unique capability 
to large scale, geographically dispersed operations by coordinating different elements 
                                                 
4 Yulin Fang. Should I stay or should I go? Worker commitment to virtual organizations. System 
Sciences, HICSS 2006. Proceedings of the 39th annual Hawaii international conference. ed. D. J. Neufeld 
(2006): 1 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.libproxy.nps.edu/search/selected.jsp. 
5 Joyce Yi-Hui Lee and Niki Panteli, “A Framework for Understanding Conflicts in Global Virtual 
Alliances.”  University of Bath School of Management (Aug 2008), 
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/research/pdf/2007-08.pdf. 
6 Sirkka L Jarvenpaa and Dorothy E. Leidner. “Communication and trust in global virtual teams,“ 
Organization Science 10, (6, Special Issue: Communication Processes for Virtual Organizations) (Nov – 
Dec 1999), 791-815, http://links.jstor.org/  
7 Extranet. Website. http://www.tartsystems.com/extranet.htm. 
8 Anthony F. Chelte, “Challenges of Virtual Teams in the Classroom,”  The Journal of Behavioral and 
Applied Management 4 no. 1 (Winter, 2003), http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/articles/vol4/article4_7.htm. 
9 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” (Nov 28, 2005).  
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from different points in space tied together by the internet.  By understanding the 
capabilities of all parties, each group may agree to work with one another from 
geographically dispersed locations and establish planning meetings virtually, either 
asynchronously or simultaneously.  However, there are certain barriers to collaboration 
that contributing partners must understand in order to share information and collaborate 
effectively which are discussed in the thesis. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The central question for this thesis is: how can non-governmental organizations 
and military personnel build collaborative capacity in humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
operations during the initial phase of an operation? 
B. PRIOR RESEARCH 
There has been extensive research in virtual collaborative networks and virtual 
work groups in industry.  There has been extensive research in understanding how the 
military and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can collaborate more effectively 
during a humanitarian aid operation.  There has been significant research in enhancing 
United States government interagency collaboration after the attacks on September 11, 
2001 and after Hurricane Katrina.  There has been limited research regarding the use of 
the information and communications technology during international disaster relief and 
humanitarian aid operations.   
In this thesis, the author discusses applicable literature of open systems theory and 
sociotechnical systems theory.  The author examines how trust and cultural understanding 
affect the propensity for individuals to communicate during HADR operations.  This is 
covered in more detail in Chapter II. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
In a humanitarian crisis or disaster relief situation, the capacity of a single 
nation’s internal disaster response capability can be overwhelmed.  Other nations and 
groups can add their collective capacity to help alleviate suffering.  There are numerous 
  4
groups and organizations that participate in HADR operations.  The United States 
Institute for Peace states that there are approximately 38,000 NGOs around the world. 10   
There are also 192 Member States of the United Nations. 11  Additionally, each member 
state of the United Nations may have air, land, and sea forces that may be used in 
humanitarian aid, disaster relief (HADR), or stabilization operations.  Finally, there were 
324 natural disasters from 1950 to 2001, which may combine many of the 
aforementioned groups. 12   
Social, cultural and organizational differences between U.S. military forces, 
multinational forces, other U.S. and foreign government agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) make interactions between members of these organizations 
engaged in stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTR) less 
effective.13  If humanitarian agencies are to perform their valuable functions of aiding 
those victimized by internal conflicts and regional warfare, they will need to cooperate 
more closely with military forces. In turn, military organizations will need to provide 
better support for the vital mission performed by UN humanitarian organizations and 
NGOs.14   
During the 2004 Asian Tsunami, collaboration between Indonesian and foreign 
troops was problematic. Initially, there were no civil-military coordination experts to 
persuade the military to share information or take aid workers on flights to assess needs. 
Nevertheless, most agreed that without the military, this would have been a major 
crisis.15  Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational as well as 
                                                 
10 Robert Perito. Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
The United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007): 101. 
11 List of  UN Member States. Website. http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml. 
12 Anonymous.  Population and Development Review, 28, no. 1 p. 171-174. (Mar 2002): 172. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092777. 
13 Roxanne Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” (Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/swifttrust100302.pdf. 
14 Andrew Harris, Peter Dombrowski “Military collaboration with humanitarian organizations in 
complex emergencies,” Global Governance 8, no. 2 (Apr 1 2002): 155-178.  
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed April 26, 2008).  
15 Iolanda Jaquemet, “World Disasters Report - Chapter 4,” The International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (2005) http://wwwuat.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2005/chapter4.asp. 
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tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, 
regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host 
nation (HN) agencies.16  
D. METHODOLOGY  
The primary method to gather data for this thesis was retrospective interviews of 
military, NGO, and IGO personnel who have been directly involved with humanitarian 
aid, disaster relief, or stabilization operations.  Telephonic interviews, face-to-face 
interviews, and questionnaires were used to determine barriers and enablers to 
collaboration.  Online questionnaires were posted on a Department of Defense 
community of interest website and a link to the questionnaire was distributed to personal 
contacts of the author.  Additionally, some respondents passed on the questionnaire to 
other qualified personnel within the humanitarian aid and disaster relief community.   
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen have provided several foundational projects for the 
author’s research.  Their development of enablers and barriers to collaboration “Building 
Collaborative Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness”17 
were used as the framework from which the author developed the thesis.   A Diagnostic 
Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context18 provided ideas 
regarding collaboration with United States government agencies.  Bertram’s Naval 
Postgraduate School thesis, Factors That Effect Interagency Collaborations: Lessons 
During and Following the 2002 Winter Olympics19 provided the format and structure for 
this work.  The majority of the questions for the thesis were derived from a questionnaire 
                                                 
16 Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I. (Mar 17 2006): I-1. 
17 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacity: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” in Innovation Through Collaboration: Advances 
in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams 12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Ltd.  (2006):  262. 
18 Gail Fann Thomas Susan Page Hocevar and Erik Jansen, “A Diagnostic Approach to Building 
Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context,” (Monterey, CA: The Naval Postgraduate School, Sep 
25 2006).   
19 Christopher D. Bertram, “Factors that Effect Interagency Collaborations: Lessons During and 
Following the 2002 Winter Olympics,” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Mar 2008).   
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developed by Dr. Roxanne Zolin.20  The discussions cover the social and technical 
aspects of including trust, culture, and communication mechanisms including face-to-face 
contact and technology.  The author analyzed the results from the interviews and 
identified what actions actors need to take to enhance collaboration and build 
collaborative capacity. 
E. SUMMARY  
The author examines the propensity of individuals and groups to collaborate by 
interviewing 34 members of the international humanitarian aid community.  Complex 
humanitarian aid operations involve members of the affected nation, NGOs, the United 
Nations, and possibly members of the United States government.  Virtual collaboration 
can provide a mechanism to improve efficiency, reduce duplication, and harmonize the 
efforts of the international aid community.   
In Chapter II, the author reviews the literature regarding systems theory and 
sociotechnical systems theory, which is used to frame the overall research.  The author 
then examines enablers to collaboration including trust, culture, and communication 
mechanisms.  The author used the themes identified in the literature regarding social and 
technical factors to collaboration.   The author generated questions from the literature for 
the questionnaire used in Chapter III.  
In Chapter III, the author discusses the methodology, the contributors, interviews, 
the interview process, analysis, and limitations to the study.  In Chapter IV, the author 
discusses the interview findings including what processes and actions participants need to 
execute to collaborate more effectively.  Types of communication media are also 
covered.  In Chapter V, the author concludes the thesis and discusses the findings, 
implications, recommendations, and further research.   
                                                 
20 Dr. Roxanne Zolin provided an unpublished paper to the author which evaluated a Department of 
Defense community of interest website.  Roxanne Zolin, “HA/DR Websites,” (Naval Postgraduate School, 
Aug 29 2007). 
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II. BACKGROUND / LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Social, organizational, and contextual factors can limit and shape the willingness 
of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share 
information and capabilities.  “Constructing collaborative information environments is 
not primarily a technology issue.  Effective, low-cost network equipment and data 
management systems exist today, and more are being developed. Rather, the challenges 
are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational.” 21  U.S. DoD Joint 
Publication JP 3-08 states, “Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated 
by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an 
intelligence source by the military.” 22  The military emphasizes national security, public 
order, and force protection—all of which are enhanced by assertively addressing and 
reducing the sources of threat whereas civilian assistance providers, on the other hand, 
equate security with ensuring that belligerents do not perceive them as a threat.23  
Interestingly, NGOs frequently possess valuable information but are reluctant to share 
intelligence with security forces for fear of reducing their relationship with the affected 
population and increasing their own risk by appearing partial. For their part, 
securityorganizations loathe sharing information with NGOs because sharing information 
                                                 
21 Larry Wentz, “An ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military 
Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction,” (Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy, National Defense University Washington, D.C., Jul 2006).   
22 Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.  (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, Mar 17 2006): III-26. 
23 Michael J. Dziedzic and Michael K. Seidl, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military 
Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan,” United States Institute 
for Peace.  Special Report 147, (Sep 2005), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.pdf, 2. 
  8
risks compromising operations and sources.24  Government officers need to be more 
sensitive and respectful of boundaries when seeking information from NGOs.25   
B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
This section reviews the systems theory and sociotechnical systems theory 
literature to describe the interaction of the participants in a humanitarian aid/disaster 
relief (HADR) operation.  Systems theory is the basic frame of reference used to describe 
humanitarian aid groups.  From this theoretical frame, the author describes how different 
factors impact the way individuals collaborate.   
Sociotechnical systems theory (STS) is the study of the interactions between 
people and machines and computers.  The author’s goal is for the reader to understand 
that social and technical factors are important to virtual collaborative networks.  It is an 
idea of joint optimization, where one element compliments the other. 
1. Systems Theory 
A system of systems that interact with each other could be seen as a system.26  
These interactions are not simple, linear cause and effect relations, but complex networks 
of interdependencies that only can be understood by their common purpose: maintaining 
the system in good health.27  A “systemic approach unifies and concentrates on the 
interaction between elements and studies the effects of interactions.” 28   
During a crisis, there is no hierarchical command and control network between 
the groups that conduct HADR operations; instead there is an ad hoc and unstructured 
                                                 
24 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington 
Quarterly. 25, no. 4 97–109. (Autumn 2002): 107. 
25 Ellen B. Laipson, “Can the USG and NGOs Do More? Information-Sharing in Conflict Zones,”  
Studies in Intelligence, 49, no. 4.  (2005),  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/USG_NGOs_5.htm.  
26 C. Heylighen, "Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach," In: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn and V. 
Turchin (Editors): Principia Cybernetica Web (Principia Cybernetica, Brussels, 1998), 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/sysappr.html. 
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 J. De Rosnay, "Analytic vs. Systemic Approaches", ed. F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn and V. Turchin, 
Principia Cybernetica Web (Brussels: Principia Cybernetica, 1997), 
http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/ANALSYST.html.    
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relationship that requires a horizontal or networked relationship.  Response organizations 
must build adaptive organizational networks that “rely on internal and external feedback, 
organizational learning from the reactions of the external environments to its decisions, 
distributed decision making by small ad hoc teams, and a high degree of flexibility and 
innovation.” 29 
“A purposive system is a multi-goal-seeking system the different goals of which 
have a common property. Production of that common property is the system's purpose.  
These types of system can pursue different goals but they do not select the goal to be 
pursued. The goal is determined by the initiating event. But such a system does choose 
the means by which to pursue its goals. “ 30  A system is an aggregate of elements 
considered together with the relationships holding among them.”31  “A system is closed if 
no material enters or leaves it; it is open if there is import and export and, therefore, 
change of the components. Living systems are open systems, maintaining themselves in 
exchange of materials with environment, and in continuous building up and breaking 
down of their components.”32  In another work, Von Beralanffy (1950) writes that, “A 
system can be defined as a complex of interacting elements.” 33 
2. Sociotechnical Systems Theory 
Emery and Trist (1969) developed sociotechnical systems theory (STS), which is 
an open systems theory.  It emphasizes that an optimizing organizational system requires 
detailed attention to both the technological and the social components.34  Kelly states that 
                                                 
29 John R. Harrald, “Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science  604 (2006): 265, 
http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/604/1/256. 
30 Russell L. Ackoff, “Towards a system of systems Concepts,” Management Science 17, (11, Theory 
Series) (Jul 1971): 666.  http://links.jstor.org/.   
31 Andras Angyal, “The Structure of Wholes,” Philosophy of Science 6, no. 1, (Jan 1939): 28. 
http://links.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu.   
32 Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, “The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biology,” Science 111, (Jan 
13 1950): 23. http://links.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/.    
33 Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, “An Outline of General System Theory,” The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 1, no. 2, (Aug 1950): 143. http://links.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/.   
34 F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, “Sociotechnical Systems,” Systems Thinking, ed. F.E. Emery, 
(Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1969): 284. 
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sociotechnical systems theory originated shortly after the Second World War in a paper 
on the effects of mechanization in British coal mines that argued that neither technology 
nor social systems could be seen as individual components, but is interrelated and interact 
with one another.35  The notion of the STS was expanded to that of the “open system”; in 
other words, an enterprise could not be treated in isolation from its “environment,” such 
as product or labor markets.36  Occupational roles express the relationship between a 
production process and the social organization of the group.37  In their seminal coal 
mining study, work groups were shattered by the introduction of new machinery, leading 
to performance levels much lower than expected by the technical considerations of 
engineers.  The engineers did not take into account the social considerations and 
reorganization required with the introduction of the machinery.  The hierarchy that was 
developed after decades of hand labor was reorganized and the mining output was not 
appreciably increased. 
Beyond matching the social and technical dimensions of work, a socio-technical 
system must also relate effectively to the task environment - those external elements that 
are relevant to the setting and achievement of system goals. 38  Sociotechnical systems 
theory seeks to improve productivity and human enrichment through a design process 
that focuses on the interdependencies among people, technology, and environment.39  
This perspective views production systems as comprised of both technological and social 
parts. The former consists of the equipment and methods of operations used to transform 
raw materials into products or services; the latter includes the work structure that relates 
                                                 
35 John E. Kelly, “A Reappraisal of Sociotechnical Systems Theory,” Human Relations 31 no. 12, 
(1978): 1071. http://hum.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/31/12/1069. 
36  Ibid. 
37 E. L. Trist and K. W. Bamforth “Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall 
Method of Coal-Getting: An Examination of the Psychological Situation and Defenses of a Work Group in 
Relation to the Social Structure and Technological Content of the Work System,” Human Relation   2 vol. 
4 (1951): 14. 
38 Thomas G. Cummings, “Self-Regulating Work Groups: A Socio-Technical Synthesis,” The 
Academy of Management Review 3, no. 3, (Jul 1978): 626. http://links.jstor.org.  
39 Ibid. 
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people to the technology and to each other.40  A sociotechnical system can perform 
optimally only if the social and technical dimensions are designed to fit the demands of 
each other and of the environment.  Attempts to optimize the technical or social 
dimension alone result in the suboptimization of the socio-technical whole.41    
C. TRUST 
Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy argued that, in designing 
organizations, too much attention is focused on individual pieces and not enough on the 
relationship of all of the pieces as they interact with one another.42 The key tenet of STS 
theory is the principle of joint optimization - an organization can perform optimally only 
if the social and technical dimensions are designed to fit the demands of each other and of 
the environment and attempts to optimize the technical or social dimension alone result in 
the suboptimization of the socio-technical whole.43  This interdependence creates a point 
in space where different teams must work together in order to solve a problem.  Trust, 
cultural understanding, and communication impact this collaboration, as discussed next.  
Mishra states, “Trust is one party's willingness to be vulnerable to another party 
based on the belief that the latter party is 1) competent, 2) open, 3) concerned, and 4) 
reliable.” 44  Additionally, Rousseau, et al. offers a compelling definition of trust, “Trust 
is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive 
                                                 
40 Thomas G. Cummings, “Self-Regulating Work Groups: A Socio-Technical Synthesis,” The 
Academy of Management Review 3, no. 3 (Jul 1978): 626. http://links.jstor.org. 
41 Victoria L. Mitchell and Barrie R. Nault, “The Emergence of Functional Knowledge in 
Sociotechnical Systems,” Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 
Nov 2003): 5. 
42 David Hanna, Understanding How Organizations Function, Designing Organizations for High 
Performance. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988): 9. 
43 Victoria L. Mitchell and Barrie R. Nault, “The Emergence of Functional Knowledge in 
Sociotechnical Systems,” Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 
Nov 2003): 5. 
44 Aneil K. Mishra, “Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust”  in Trust In 
Organizations, ed. Kramer, Roderick M. and Thomas Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1996): 5. 
http://totaltrust.files.wordpress.com/2006/02/Trust%20Book%20Chapter1.pdf  
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expectations of the expectations or behavior of another.” 45 Furthermore, trust is critical 
in developing a collaborative relationship over time.  However, Dodgson contends that 
effective learning between partners depends on the construction of a "climate" of trust 
engrained in organizational modes of behavior, and supported by the belief in the mutual 
benefits of collaboration throughout the organization.  Dodgson also states that many 
studies of the process of collaboration refer to the necessity of high levels of trust 
between partner firms in order to facilitate communication and learning; trust is a crucial 
component.  46  Zolin’s concept of swift trust is couched within temporary teams, 
particularly when there is pressure due to time or importance ascribed to achieving the 
project goals. This is typical of the context of SSTR.  Swift trust is, “The willingness to 
rely upon team members to perform their formal and informal roles in a hastily formed 
temporary team involved in some aspect of SSTR (Security, Stabilization, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations).” 47 
Trust is a critical element in order to communicate effectively.  Holohan states (p. 
35), trust is intrinsic to greater identification with the mission, greater exchange of 
resources and information, and greater cooperation in problem solving. 48  If one group or 
person does not trust another, they may not provide information that can impact the 
overall effort of the operation.  According to Sztompka’s missive on Trust, instrumental 
trust is based on expectations of relating to capability, reliability, dependability, 
competency, and efficiency.49  In addition, Sztompka also elaborates on the concept of 
axiological trust which is based on moral expectations of integrity and for moral 
                                                 
45 Denise M Rousseau, Sim B Sitkin, Ronald S Burt, Colin Camerer. “Not So Different After All: A 
Cross-Discipline View of Trust,” Academy of Management. The Academy of Management 
Review 23, no. 3 (July 11 998): 395. http://www.proquest.com. 
46 Mark Dodgson, “Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration,” Human Relations, 
46, no. 1 (January 11 993): 77.  http://www.proquest.com/.   
47 Roxanne Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” (Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/swifttrust100302.pdf. 
48 Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
49 Piotr Sztompka. Trust:  A Sociological Theory, (U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 53. 
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responsibility.50  Performance can be measured and trust can be granted conditionally, 
based on the results of the evaluation period.51   
These interactions are not simple, linear cause and effect relations, but complex 
networks of interdependencies. 52  The relationship between participants as they interact 
with one another53 is critical to enable trust between groups.  Trust is critically important 
in new and temporary organizations, because it acts as a substitute for the traditional 
mechanisms of control and coordination.54   
D. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING 
Arai states that culture is an ever-evolving system of shared patterns of meaning-
making that consciously and sub-consciously shape and reshape human behaviors and 
perceptions; it is a dynamic process through which people come to assign symbolic 
meaning to natural and social phenomena and to perceive what they believe is legitimate 
or illegitimate.55  Culture is another component to enhancing or enabling collaboration.  
Lipnack and Stamps (1997) make a case that a successful virtual community is 90 percent 
culture and 10 percent technology.56  Differences in organizational missions, structures 
and processes, and cultures create problems that make communication, coordination, 
cooperation and ultimately collaboration less effective.57   
                                                 
50 Piotr Sztompka. Trust:  A Sociological Theory, (U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 54. 
51 Ibid., 77-78. 
52 Ibid., 3. 
53 David Hanna, Understanding How Organizations Function, Designing Organizations for High 
Performance. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988): 9. 
54 Eva C. Kasper-Fuehrera and Neal M. Ashkanasy, “Communicating Trustworthiness And Building 
Trust In Interorganizational Virtual Organizations,” Journal of Management 27 (2001): 238, 
http://jom.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/27/3/235.   
55 Tatushi Atai, “Making Sense of it All: Cross Cultural Understanding,” (The Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies presented a workshop on cultural 
understanding in Monterey, CA, Sep 12 2007). 
56 D. Calvin Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community,” 
Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3, (Sept. 2005): 25. 
57  Roxanne Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” (Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/swifttrust100302.pdf. 
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 Anne Holohan provides a unique insight into culture and HADR and stabilization 
operations.  She states, “For a network organization to be effective, it must produce an 
institutional culture, or a share identify and understanding of how things are done, that 
serve throughout its existence.” 58  This new culture is created when collaborating 
organizations come together in response to a problem.  The new culture must foster trust 
and identification with the new organization as well as the mission; only then sufficient 
information exchange and cooperative problem solving occur to fulfill the mission’s 
goals.59   
 Organizations may have contrasting objectives, strategies for reaching their goals, 
and measures of success, all of which contribute to misunderstanding and distrust. Even 
when actors overcome ideological, language, and professional barriers, other obstacles, 
such as competition over limited resources, remain. 60  For information to flow across 
community divides, members must identify with a mission larger than their 
organization’s own goals. In places where trust is a rare commodity, personal 
relationships are essential for making things happen. 61  Experiences and lessons from 
real-world relief efforts and post-conflict recovery operations suggest the need to create a 
common culture of trust in information networks and communications between civilian 
governments, military organizations, IGOs, and NGOs. 62   
 To summarize, HADR operations are systems.  Each HADR group interacts with 
other systems during an operation.  Individual participants interact with one another as 
elements of larger systems.  Today, participants have access to technology that can 
enhance collaboration, but trust and cultural understanding are essential to effective 
collaboration.   
                                                 
58 Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005): 6. 
59 Ibid., 90. 
60 Rebecca Linder, “Wikis, Webs, and Networks:  Creating Connections for Conflict- Prone-Settings,” 
(Oct 15 2006): 9, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061018_pcr_creatingconnections.pdf. 
61 Ibid., 24. 
62 Larry Wentz, An ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military 
Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction.  (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, July 2006): 5. 
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1. Cultural Misunderstanding and the Need for Trust 
 Different cultural approaches to information affect the priority given to seeking 
information-sharing relationships.63  Government officers need to be more sensitive and 
respectful of boundaries when seeking information from NGOs.64  Creating a common 
communications culture—increasing trust and setting a foundation for collaboration and 
information sharing—must be done without undermining either the neutrality of civilians, 
IGOs, and NGOs or the need for the military to safeguard operational security 
information.65  There must be a common new culture that fosters trust and identification 
with the mission; only then sufficient information exchange and cooperative problem 
solving occur to fulfill the mission’s goals. 66  Pre-existing common culture and the 
demand for trust within the collaboration strongly affect how much formal and informal 
trust is produced in collaboration. 67  The military’s distinct organizational culture, which 
makes the military very effective in combat, may frustrate civilian relief organization 
personnel, who may find the military inflexible and inscrutable.  By contrast, civilian 
relief organizations often have radically different organizational cultures and structures. 
They tend to be less formal, less authoritarian, and less focused on internal traditions or 
security concerns. 68  Military organizations have a very proactive and obtrusive force 
protection posture designed to ward off threats through a variety of mechanisms 
including patrols, intelligence gathering activities, interrogations, and maintaining 
constant vigilance of future actions and planning through operational security (OPSEC).  
NGOs, correspondingly, maintain their safety by establishing an aura of transparency and 
                                                 
63 Ellen B. Laipson, “Can the USG and NGOs Do More? Information-Sharing in Conflict Zones,”  
Studies in Intelligence, 49, no. 4.  (2005),  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/USG_NGOs_5.htm. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Larry Wentz, An ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military 
Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction.  (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, July 2006): 51. 
66 Anne, Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005): 90. 
67 Ibid., 72-73. 
68 Larry Wentz, An ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military 
Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction.  (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
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neutrality designed to establish a façade of benevolence towards other parties.  These 
approaches to security and force protection are diametrically opposed: closed versus 
open.  The military emphasizes national security, public order, and force protection, 
which are enhanced by assertively addressing and reducing the sources of threat; on the 
other hand, civilian assistance providers equate security with ensuring that belligerents do 
not perceive them as a threat.69  
 Another interesting cultural difference is that humanitarian organizations seek to 
alleviate suffering without regard for the aid recipient’s affiliation with any of the parties 
to a conflict. There is a reluctance to share information with the military, due to the 
civilian groups’ desire to remain independent and neutral as private aid groups do not 
want to be perceived by the population and affected nation’s leadership as an 
intelligence-gathering arm of the military. 70 When military units in combat provide 
“humanitarian-type” relief, it is typically associated with political objectives.71   
E. MECHANISMS OF COMMUNICATION 
Participants from developed countries have a multitude of capabilities available to 
them prior to deployment.  In the field, actors may or may not have access to the internet 
or cellular service, but communications technology plays a role during an operation.  
However, participants still contact one another via a variety of different communication 
mechanisms including face-to-face contact, telephones, and radios.   
1. Face-to-Face Contact and Virtual Collaboration 
Face-to-face meetings are invaluable when establishing trust in distributed 
environments where the majority of communication is via telephone, email, or radios.  
                                                 
69 Michael J. Dziedzic and Michael K. Seidl, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military 
Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan,” United States Institute 
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Face-to-face interaction is crucial for achieving an exchange of knowledge.72  Today, 
collaborative websites add an additional capability to humanitarian aid organizations, but 
groups must still meet with one another in order to harmonize capabilities.  In a study of the 
use of virtual workspaces in industry, members report the value of the face-to-face meetings 
which helped them coordinate during their virtual meetings and many members reported that 
having met a person previously at a face-to-face meeting helps them understand the other 
person much more clearly.73  Time spent face-to-face with key actors in the humanitarian 
community, on the ground, can potentially produce greater collaborative results. 
For groups who have long-term agendas, building trust is an important component of 
the team-building process.  In a study targeting trust in virtual teams, Jarvenpaa and Leidner 
found that trust in virtual teams may form fast, but may not be substantial.74  Zolin and 
Hinds state, 
…trust may be more difficult to develop because coworkers have fewer 
opportunities to interact face-to-face, have less unplanned interaction, rely 
more heavily on technology to mediate their interactions, and often are more 
heterogeneous because they inhabit different cultural contexts.75   
Hossain and Wigand state that initial face-to-face communication is an essential 
prerequisite in establishing higher levels of trust among agents working from a 
geographically dispersed location.  ICT-enabled virtual collaboration would be effective with 
the existence of face-to-face communication support and would lead to higher levels of 
satisfaction in collaboration.  They conclude with the observation that building trustworthy 
relationships among agents is dependent on the level of face-to-face communication 
support.76 
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Holohan describes the communication methods in Kosovo between the United 
Nations Civil Administrator and other groups in descending priority: face-to-face contact, 
telephone, voice mail, and then email. 77  The participants repeatedly focused on the need 
for face-to-face contact, especially in conflict or post-conflict settings.  Initial meetings 
between personnel were nearly always conducted face-to-face.  Rutkowski conducted a 
study of 268 participants from different professional and national cultures working 
together for six weeks on a specific IT project and stated that it is difficult to build 
efficient and operational teams in the absence of synchronous face-to-face 
communication, and that low levels of social presence and interactivity are recognized as 
main factors of failure in virtual teams.78 Kasper-Fuehrera and Ashkanasy state that 
computer mediated communication (CMC) is a powerful tool to overcome time and 
distance barriers, but it suffers from the limitation that nonverbal communication, an 
important component in trust building, is difficult to achieve. Thus, while nonverbal cues 
are included in CMC, they are clearly not as easily transmitted as they are in face-to-face 
communication and interpretation of these cues is subject to cultural differences. As such, 
and since nonverbal cues are central to communication of trust, this represents a critical 
potential limitation to the value of virtual organizations.79   
In a study focusing on trust in virtual teams, Jarvenpaa and Leidner found that 
trust and relationship building were crucial in virtual teams; it may form fast, but may not 
be substantial.80 Computer mediated communication (CMC) is a powerful tool to 
overcome time and distance barriers, but it suffers from the limitation that nonverbal 
communication, an important component in trust building, is difficult to achieve. Thus, 
while nonverbal cues are included in CMC, they are clearly not as easily transmitted as 
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they are in face-to-face communication.81  Mark (1998) states, “Some virtual team 
members report the value of the face-to-face interaction as providing information that 
helps the teams coordinate themselves during their virtual meetings and many members 
reported that having met a person previously in a face-to-face meeting helps them 
manage speaking turns with that person, interpret silences (is someone reflective?), and 
gives them a better understanding of questions.”82  
2. Technical Mechanisms of Communication 
Information and communications technology (ICT) is an umbrella term that 
includes any communication device or application, encompassing: radio, television, 
cellular phones, computer and network hardware and software, satellite systems and so 
on, as well as the various services and applications associated with them, such as 
videoconferencing.83  Virtual collaboration refers to the use of ICT for supporting the 
collective interaction among multiple parties involved. 84  Groups can leverage the power 
of the internet to harmonize their efforts.  As companies expand globally, face increasing 
time compression in product development, and use more foreign-based subcontracting 
labor, virtual teams promise the flexibility, responsiveness, lower costs, and improved 
resource utilization necessary to meet ever-changing task requirements in highly 
turbulent and dynamic global business environments.85  The interface that individuals 
make with the computers is extended beyond their line of sight to cover greater 
geographic areas.  This ability to stretch resources and capabilities is a key element to 
collaboration, virtually. The concept of virtual implies permeable interfaces and 
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boundaries; project teams that rapidly form, reorganize, and dissolve when the needs of a 
dynamic marketplace change; and individuals with differing competencies who are 
located across time, space, and cultures.86   
Holohan elaborates on the ways virtual forms of communication play a central 
role and may substitute for direct, face-to-face communication to a large extent.  The 
history of people’s interaction become part of the common interpretive space, and 
socioemotional content – trust, friendship, traditions, bonds, and so on – becomes part of 
that common interpretive space.87    
The Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense defines a community 
of interest (COI) as, “Collaborative groups of users who must have a shared vocabulary 
to exchange information in pursuit of their shared goals, interests, missions, or business 
processes. This group includes end users, program managers, application developers, 
subject matter experts, Combatant Command, Service and Agency representatives, and 
IT Portfolio representatives.”88  Much online contact is between people, who see each 
other in person.  They mix email communication with face-to-face communication, 
phones, and radios; conversations that start in one medium continue in another. 89   
3. Communication Challenges 
Deployed personnel often lack reliable and interoperable communications links 
with local and international partners.90  Problems include insufficient bandwidth, 
destroyed cell phone towers, no power, and incompatible equipment among partners.  
Moreover, even reliable communications technology is not as effective as face-to-face 
contact.   
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F. SUMMARY  
The United Nations Interagency Standing Committee states, “It is the essential 
dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian 
emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid 
competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.” 91  
U.S. DoD Joint Publication JP-3-08 emphasizes, “Military operations must be 
strategically integrated and operational as well as tactically coordinated with the activities 
of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of 
foreign forces, and activities of various host nation agencies.” 92  The complex nature of 
HADR systems interacting with other systems creates points in space where collaboration 
can occur.  The author highlighted the importance of trust, culture, face-to-face contact, 
and technical elements to enhance collaboration.  Technical elements of collaboration 
include access to the internet, reliable power, and cellular phones.  Virtual collaborative 
networks are attractive to participants as a result of their ability to enhance efficiency and 
communication.  
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A. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The research question for this thesis is: how can non-governmental organizations 
and military personnel build collaborative capacity in humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
operations during the initial phase of an operation?  The author divided the latter portion 
of the literature review into two sections: social and technical enablers to collaboration.  
These two components must be jointly optimized to use each of the two elements 
maximally.  For example, a high-quality website or virtual collaborative tool without any 
members is completely worthless.  In addition, participants and groups may maintain 
great relationships, trust one another, and have vast cultural understanding.  They must be 
aware that face-to-face contact is needed to establish trust.  By coupling all of the 
different processes together, participants can use joint optimization to enhance their 
collective collaboration and utilize their resources and capabilities more efficiently.  This 
chapter describes the research methodology, the interview questions, the interview 
process, and how the interviews were analyzed.  The author concludes with limitations to 
the study.93   
1. Contributors 
Thirty-four personnel were interviewed from various civil and military groups.  
Twenty-three military personnel, three members of NGOs, two members of the United 
Nations, and six members of the U.S. government were interviewed.  The participants 
described their level of experience, their organizational position during the operation, and 
to which group they belonged: NGO, military, US Interagency, or international 
organization.  The participants have had at least one year of experience.  The majority of 
the interviewees had more than five years of experience.  The author ensured participants 
worked with other groups, i.e. NGO with military, international organization with 
military, etc.  Organizations include the Mission Aviation Fellowship, Project Hope, the 
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Research Triangle Institute, InterAction, the United Nations, U.S. State Department, U.S. 
Department of Defense, the U.S. and German Army, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and 
the U.S. Marine Corps, and the emergency services division of the Dallas-Fort Worth 
International Airport.  Interview participants have experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
Philippines, the Pakistani Earthquake, the South Asia Tsunami, the Bangladesh Cyclone, 
or aboard the US Navy’s Hospital ships during medical diplomacy missions.  There were 
four women and thirty men interviewed.   
The author also attended several conferences and deployed aboard the USNS 
COMFORT from June through July 2007.  The first conference was a cultural 
understanding conference in October, 2007.  Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) hosted the “Making Sense of it All: 
Cross-Cultural Understanding” from September 9-2, 2007.  The second conference was 
the U.S. Navy's 2008 Stability and Security Conference from January 30-31, 2008, 
Crystal City, VA.  The author also deployed to Guatemala, Belize, and Panama aboard 
the USNS COMFORT.  At all of the events the author was able to interact and interview 
various members of NGOs, the United Nations, foreign militaries, and the services of the 
U.S. Military.  The author also attended a briefing regarding the post-earthquake recovery 
in May 2008.  The planner for the operation provided a briefing regarding hastily formed 
networks and civil-military collaboration.  The author asked questions regarding culture, 
the development of trust, the ICT infrastructure, and interaction with international aid 
groups.   
2. Interviews 
The discussions covered trust, culture, ICT, and face-to-face contact.  Participants 
also discussed barriers to collaboration including ICT problems and cultural 
misunderstanding.  Finally, the author analyzed the results from the interviews and 
identified themes to enable or erode collaboration. Those themes can help provide leaders 
and operators within the HADR community improve future collaboration. 94   
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The interviews were divided into three sections.  The first section of the interview 
determined participant experience.  The second section determined how trust and culture 
impact information sharing and collaboration.  The final section discussed specific 
communication mechanisms.  The author has provided several questions below; the 
complete list of questions is provided in Appendix A. 
• What are the primary modes of information sharing that you use? 
• How do you develop trust in HADR operations? 
• How did you contact the individual or group? 
• Are there barriers to collaboration in virtual information and work groups? 
• What are the cultural barriers to collaboration? 
In face-to-face and telephonic interviews, the author was able to ask additional 
questions regarding enabling components to collaboration, primary sources for 
information, and how history and personal networks enhance collaboration.  The author 
also asked specific questions to individuals with unique skill-sets or experiences.   
3. Interview Process 
The primary method for gathering data was retrospective interviews of military, 
NGO, and IGO personnel who have been directly involved with humanitarian aid, 
disaster relief, or stabilization operations.  The author used multiple methods to obtain 
information regarding enhancing collaborative capacity between aid groups.   
Telephone interviews and questionnaires were used to determine how trust, 
culture, and different communication methods impact individual collaboration.  Some 
participants were sent the questionnaire via email.  The participant had the choice to fill 
out the interview and email back the completed questionnaire or to conduct a telephone 
interview.  If the participant agreed to a telephonic interview, the author called the 
participant and conducted the interview.  The interviews lasted approximately thirty to 
forty-five minutes.  The author focused attention of how individual participants 
communicated with one another in the field.  The author also conducted face-to-face 
interviews various field experts at the two conferences, at meetings on the Naval 
Postgraduate School campus, and aboard the USNS COMFORT while deployed. 
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Online questionnaires were posted on a Department of Defense community of 
interest website and a link to the questionnaire was distributed to personal contacts of the 
author.  Additionally, some respondents passed on the questionnaire to other qualified 
personnel within the humanitarian aid and disaster relief community.  The questions for 
the thesis were derived from a questionnaire developed by Dr. Roxanne Zolin.  95   
4. Analysis 
The results were analyzed and compared to literature regarding trust, culture, and 
various communication mechanisms.  Interview results were reviewed to discover 
common themes.  These themes were compared to the literature.  Some of the common 
themes were the importance of trust, cultural understanding, and face-to-face contact. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A limitation of the study was the small size of the participant group.  A greater 
representation of the aid community would be beneficial.  The author did not tape or 
transcribe the interviews.  In several instances respondents did not want to conduct a 
telephonic interview, but filled out the questionnaire and sent back the completed 
questionnaire via email.  In other instances, some individuals had not been involved in a 
HADR or stabilization operation for several years and ICT equipment was not used.  The 
amount of time between the interview and their deployment could reflect inaccuracies of 
the actual events.  Some individuals were also only willing to fill out the questionnaire, 
but did not want to be interviewed over the phone.  This precluded the author from asking 
follow-up or probing questions if there was a certain event or statement which warranted 
further explanation or clarification. 
C. SUMMARY 
The author gathered information from 34 individuals from the humanitarian aid 
community.  Thirty-four individuals responded to open-ended questions via telephone, 
                                                 
95 Dr. Zolin provided an unpublished paper to the author which evaluated a Department of Defense 
community of interest website.  Roxanne Zolin, “HA/DR Websites,” (Monterey,  CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School Aug 29 2007).   
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filled out a questionnaire, or emailed the results back to the author.  The author used 
unstructured, open-ended interviews in multiple circumstances to investigate how 
individuals communicated with individuals from other groups in the field.   The purpose 
of the research was to determine what social factors enabled collaboration and to 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
The thesis was developed to answer the question, how can non-governmental 
organizations and military personnel build collaborative capacity in humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief operations during the initial phase of an operation?  This chapter details 
participant responses to questionnaires and interviews.  Trust, culture, and different 
communication media affect and impact an individual’s propensity to collaborate and 
share information.  The interview results generally support the literature review in 
Chapter II.  Furthermore, the author’s results were inductive.  The questionnaire and the 
literature review were tied to one another and the author’s preconceived ideas were 
biased by the literature. 
1. Trust, Cultural Understanding, and Communication   
The interviews confirmed that social and technical factors impact collaboration.   
Social factors including trust, face-to-face contact, ICT, and culture were confirmed to be 
enablers to collaboration.   
a. Trust and Cultural Factors 
Ninety-one percent stated there was organizational distrust between 
groups.  Fifty percent of the respondents stated a lack of trust was a barrier to 
collaboration.  Fifty-three percent of the respondents stated culture was a barrier to 
collaboration.  One respondent stated, “Many times DoD personnel need to tone down 
the military profile when working with DOS [Department of State] or civilian agencies.”  
Another participant stated, “Most NGOs see all militaries the same; as the initiators of 
violence. Most in the military see NGOs as ineffective and ‘tree huggers.  Another 
participant said, “Getting over the ‘what's in it for me’ attitude---quickly.”  An NGO 
participant who worked with the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq stated, the 
cultural understanding between NGOs and the military was “very bad” and it seemed 
like, “we were speaking different languages.” Cultural misunderstanding and technical 
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problems were barriers to collaboration.  The author spoke to an expert from the Dallas 
Office of Emergency Management and asked, “How do you develop trust in HADR 
operations?” She replied: 
Pre-event.  When people are most relaxed and tend to want to listen to 
each other’s ideas, issues and concerns more. As has been stated multiple 
times, it’s too late to be exchanging business cards when you’re on the 
scene of a disaster.  There also needs to be trusted agents from the affected 
community involved in the operation.  Without the buy-in from the 
community via these agents, the operation won’t be as efficient and 
effective as it could be.  Training and exercising pre-event are key to 
building those relationships and finding out who the “go-to” people are as 
well as those who can’t and shouldn’t be trusted.     
A U.S. Army officer who deployed to Afghanistan as the commander of a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team stated, “Yes, but methods for overcoming [cultural 
understanding] are often personality-based; one must start somewhere.”  An Army Civil 
Affairs Colonel who worked with the International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan used traditional mechanisms of coordination and collaboration.  Meetings 
were scheduled several times a week with his counterparts within the Afghan government 
and meetings with Turkish Civil-military units occurred face-to-face.  He stated, “Trust 
was established quickly as a result of their common background in civil affairs and being 
members of the military” and “trust and rapport” enhanced their communication and 
coordination.  Furthermore, the lack of telecommunications infrastructure prohibited the 
use of the internet.  A participant confirmed “That appreciation for another’s’ 
perspectives is based on consensus building and trust.” Another stated, “It is a mixture of 
capabilities and experience as well as an understanding of the culture.”  The author asked 
an Army Civil Affairs officer and former commander of a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, “How do you develop trust in HADR operations?”  She replied, “By finding 
opportunities to build trust and share unclassified information, as much possible and by 
not taking over meetings, staying in the background and listening.”  
A U.N. expert in civil-military relations provided an interesting statement 
regarding the terms on humanitarian aid and disaster relief.  He stated, “Humanitarian 
Assistance is based on needs and the term should be reserved for organizations being able 
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to establish neutrality, impartiality and humanity, or NGOs. The military should use 
disaster relief in developing trust in HADR operations.”  
The author asked a participant about organizational distrust and 
appreciation for another’s perspectives.  They replied, “As long as everyone is able to 
leave their ego at the door, there’s an appreciation for each other’s perspectives.  When 
agencies refuse to see that there are other factors at work and that we all have ‘bosses’ to 
answer to, there tends to be more animosity.  The sooner everyone realizes that we’re all 
in it together and we all have the same goal of saving lives and relieving suffering, the 
more fluid the response seems to be.   Yes, the military folks seem to come with a level 
of arrogance that they’re going to show us ‘local folks’ how to do it.”   
b. Mechanisms of Communication  
Sixty-two percent of the respondents stated they used face-to-face contact 
as their most frequent method of communicating with other participants.  A U.S. Army 
Civil Affairs officer who is a former commander of an Afghanistan Provincial 
Reconstruction Team stated “That they used a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), 
to contact members of another group.”  Regarding communication in the field, she stated, 
“It has to be face to face or phone, virtual if time and space is too hard to overcome.”  A 
U.N. expert in civil-military relations was asked, “Did you use the website’s tools?”  He 
replied, “Files, chat, video, and sometimes Skype; generally speaking, our connections in 
the field are too slow.” Although high-tech equipment can overcome some of the 
obstacles, they cannot be sustained by local authorities and therefore inappropriate with 
regard to medium and long term coordination.  A member of the Dallas Office of 
Emergency Management stated her interactions were done, “Via face-to-face, telephone, 
e-mail, other agencies, and in any other manner that was appropriate at the time, however 
face-to-face and telephonic communication are always preferred.”  A Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel who was the officer in charge of the Civil-Military Operations Center during the 
Bangladesh typhoon affirmed, “Interpersonal relationships and organizational contacts” 
were the keys to collaboration.  In addition, their primary communication techniques 
were cell phones and face-to-face contact.  The U.N. expert in civil-military relations 
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recommended “Face-to-face contact to hash out differences and goal setting.”  The author 
asked a U.N. expert in civil-military relations, “With whom did he choose to share 
information?”  He replied, “Tested sources and partners, based on trust, confidence and 
experience.”   
The author asked, “In your opinion, what made the collaboration 
successful?”  A participant replied, “[by] talking to each other before acting. It [the 
operation] would have been successful if orders and policies were geared towards 
achieving same goal.” Another stated, “Personal interaction between ‘guys on the 
ground’ and open line of communication and trust.” 
The author spoke to another U.S. Army Civil Affairs Major who served as 
a Civil Affairs Team – Alpha (CAT-A) team leader in Afghanistan.  He stated that, “All 
of his coordination with Provincial Reconstruction Team civilians was through face-to-
face communication.”  He also stated, “With locals in both the Philippines and Iraq, it 
was cell phone and face-to-face. With USG personnel it was email and face to face.”   
The author also spoke to an NGO whose specialization was aviation and 
telecommunications support during disaster relief operations.  The NGO participant 
established remote telecommunications sites after the Indonesian Tsunami and 
established numerous telecommunications sites during the USNS COMFORT’s mission 
to the Southern Hemisphere in 2007.  Regarding his interaction with the military, he 
stated that, “Exercises and operations such as the USNS COMFORT’s mission 
established trust and rapport between his NGO and members of the military.”  He 
reiterated, “Face-to-face introductions go a long way toward communication,” and, “by 
just meeting people,” collaboration can be enhanced.  Another participant stated, “Trust 
is built, technologies and tools are tested.”  The author asked another member of the 
military, “How do you develop trust in HADR operations?”  He replied, “Establishing 
relationships, a priori.” 
The U.N. expert in civil-military relations stated that large geographic 
distances and discussions over email, teleconference, and virtual networking proved 
worthless in several exercises and deployments.  Only when key players had met 
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repeatedly and developed trust over time was true collaboration achieved. 96  One 
participant replied, “In the field it has to be face to face or phone, virtual if time and 
space is too hard to overcome.” 
The author attended the Navy’s Stabilization and Security Conference 
from 30-31 January 2008 in Washington D.C.  Rui Lopes, who is the Director of 
Network Operations from Save the Children, provided some interesting insights 
regarding information sharing and communication.  He stated collaboration was based on 
“human interaction and relationships” and the relationships on the ground between 
people and “knowing the key players” were important to communication.  A participant 
stated, “…it helps in developing social networks and understanding the culture of other 
groups and how to relate and communicate with them.”  The author asked, “Is there an 
appreciation for the others’ perspectives?”  A participant replied, “Sometimes, again it is 
based on consensus building and trust.”  Another stated, “Yes, but only once the other 
group realizes that there is some sort of professionalism and added value behind 
discussions and coordination work.”  Another stated, “As long as everyone is able to 
leave their ego at the door, there’s an appreciation for each other’s perspectives.   
c.  Technical Factors  
Thirty-five percent of the respondents stated they used email as their most 
frequent method to contact other participants.  Thirty-two percent of the respondents 
stated bandwidth was a barrier to collaboration because it slowed down internet speed.  
Sixty-seven percent of the respondents stated websites, email, and phones were barriers 
to collaboration.  Cellular phones and text messages are also used heavily.   
The author spoke to an U.S. Army Civil Affairs Lieutenant Colonel who 
served as a commander of a PRT in Afghanistan who has extensive experience in civil 
affairs operations, but also in information sharing via the internet and virtual work 
groups.  The author asked, “Do you feel that communities of interest (COI) websites are a 
valuable tool to share information in order to build collaborative capacity and increase 
efficiency?”  She replied, “Yes and no, often there are too many sites to check.  If I 
                                                 
96 Anonymous United Nations Official A, online questionnaire received by author 15 NOV 07. 
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checked each one everyday, that is all I would get done.  Most helpful sites are ones that 
notify me via email or RSS that something in my area of interest has changed.”   
One NGO respondent stated that phones, Skype, Groove, and SMS (short 
message service) or texting were critical.  Another military officer, with experience in 
leading the effort during the aftermath of the Pakistani Earthquake used SMS and texting 
extensively.  He also stated that the local telecommunications infrastructure was not 
developed to support the needs of the US assistance force.  Furthermore, the Pakistani 
military internet system was not compatible with US “.mil” web addresses.  
The author also interviewed a member of the U.S. military who deployed 
from two months to Utapao, Thailand to aid in the Tsunami relief effort.  He worked with 
NGOs, local aid groups, international militaries, and IGOs.  He used a variety of methods 
to communicate.  His primary method was via cell phone, secondary was commercial 
email, tertiary was video teleconference, and finally land lines.  The author asked how 
useful the websites he used were and he interestingly stated, “As useful as the lead 
agency used it. None were fully useful and the primary collab[oration] [tool] was [the] 
cell phone and email w/ att [attachments].”   The author also asked, “Are there other 
lateral mechanisms via face to face coordination i.e. liaison personnel established in order 
to ensure collaboration and harmonize operations?”  He replied, “Yes.” The author then 
asked: “are these preferred to virtual collaboration?”  He replied, “Always.” 
An NGO who was a member of a consortium attempting to establish a 
community of interest website for NGO information sharing and collaboration mentioned 
that it was difficult for NGOs to decide on a virtual collaborative website or application 
because of resource constraints.  He also stated that groups wanted to communicate, 
butcould not decide on a common website because of resources and organizational 
culture.   He also mentioned, “Bandwidth was a major problem in communication in 
Bangladesh after their typhoon in 2007.”97  Another stated, “Yes, bandwidth can often be 
an issue.” 
                                                 
97 Comments from a speaker at the Navy’s Security and Stabilization Conference, (Crystal City, VA.  
January 30 - 31, 2008). 
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The author interviewed a U.N. representative with extensive experience in 
civil-military relations who is a published author and recognized professional in the field. 
She was based at the Utapao Airbase in Thailand in the Asian Tsunami relief operations.  
In that event, the U.N. element was the coordinating mechanism between twelve nations.  
Unfortunately, the element was based inside a military base which excluded many of the 
NGOs that were involved in the relief effort.  Regarding the type of communication they 
used, limited bandwidth was a serious impediment to access complex websites which 
limited their access and use.  Additionally, she was so busy that she did not have the 
opportunity to sit down at a computer terminal to input data into a website as they only 
had between seven and fifteen U.N. staffers at any one time.  They did use meetings and 
face-to-face contact to coordinate operations.  They also used the U.N.’s Virtual OSOCC, 
On-Site Operations Coordination Center, and email, but the people that used it were 
people that had known one another in the past.  The “main purpose of the Virtual 
OSOCC is to facilitate decision-making for international response to major disasters 
though real-time information exchange by all actors of the international disaster response 
community.” 98  However, the U.N.’s Virtual OSOCC couldn’t open because of limited 
bandwidth.  There was also so much information to process to try to put everything on a 
website slowed down operations.   
She also conducted a multinational experiment between the United 
Nations, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  They used audio and chat via the internet, but could only speak to one another 
one at a time, causing slowdowns and confusion between participants.  They also 
conducted some experiments with Turkey, the U.S., Belgium, and the UK with over fifty 
users on a teleconference.  There was actually “too much information” being passed 
between participants.  There were also some NGOs involved, including the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and InterAction.  She felt that the virtual information 
sharing venues (teleconferencing, chat, etc.) limited communication because without 
face-to-face contact, contributors could only speak to the official policy of the 
                                                 
98 The United Nations’ Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre.  Website. 
http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc. 
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organization and everything had to be, “on the record.”  Face-to-face contact gave the 
participants the opportunity to speak candidly and to give their honest, personal 
assessments of a particular event or situation.  The virtual option participants were “less 
inclined to be honest.”  The two NGOs, ICRC and InterAction, were very frustrated with 
JFCOM video teleconference meetings and decided to meet off-site with the Department 
of State, USAID, and the Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization 
at the ICRC compound in order speak more candidly where they could not share online.   
During the Lebanon evacuation crisis, the U.N. representative used no 
computers and just speaker phones to coordinate.  She said, “That worked much better.”  
The reasons why were because information exchange was in real-time and the 
participants had already developed relationships with one another and were “comfortable 
with one another.”  A participant stated, “Generally speaking, our connections in the field 
are too slow.  Although high-tech equipment can overcome some of the obstacles, they 
cannot be sustained by local authorities and [are] therefore inappropriate with regard to 
medium and long term coordination.” 
The author asked two participants a specific follow-up question regarding 
power and reliable communications.  A participant who aided in the response effort after 
Hurricane Katrina stated, “Yes, the convention center where we located our operations 
was three floors [and] underground the multiple layers of cement impeded our ability to 
communicate in the first few days.  Repeaters were put in place after that and 
communication became much easier.”  Another participant replied to the same question, 
“It always is, and maybe the most important one: to have simple and reliable 
communications.” 
B. SUMMARY 
The interviews of the thirty-four humanitarian aid experts stated trust, culture, and 
face-to-face contact were important to enhancing collaboration between groups.  The 
experts also specified barriers to collaboration: cultural misunderstanding and technical 




A. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
This thesis was designed to answer the question: “how can non-governmental 
organization and military personnel build collaborative capacity in humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief operations during the initial phase of an operation?”  This chapter discusses 
the findings and their implications as they relate to the literature.  The interview results 
generally support the review in Chapter II. 
The participants were asked a variety of questions regarding experience, 
collaborating with aid actors, the type of communication medium they used, and social 
factors that were enablers or barriers to collaboration during HADR or stabilization 
operations.   
Daft and Engel define information richness as the ability of information to change 
understanding within a time interval. Communications that require a long time to enable 
understanding or that cannot overcome different perspectives are lower in richness. In a 
sense, richness pertains to the learning capacity of a communication.  They state, in order 
of decreasing richness, the media classifications are (1) face-to- face, (2) telephone, (3) 
personal documents such as letters or memos, (4) impersonal written documents, and (5) 
numeric documents.  The reason for richness differences includes the medium's capacity 
for immediate feedback, the number of cues and channels utilized personalization, and 
language variety. The data revealed that individuals preferred to use a high richness 
media source.  99  Dr. Richard Snyder and this author derived a model of the interaction 
between military and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel.  The model 
indicates that each individual must have cultural understanding of other groups, they 
should meet in a neutral setting, the military person must be aware of the impact of a full 
battle dress uniform with weapons, helmet, and body armor, and it must occur face-to-
face.  From that initial face-to-face meeting, swift trust can be developed.  In addition, 
                                                 
99 Richard L. Daft, and Robert H. Lengel. “Organizational information requirements, media richness 
and structural design,” Management Science 32, (5, Organization Design) (May 1986), 
http://links.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/.   
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Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen state ‘‘felt need’’ is likely to be a prerequisite for building 
collaborative relationships.100  We also recommend a reason or need to work together 
and collaborate.  This also was supported in Bertram’s thesis, which described felt need 
as a compelling reason for several different organizations to work together in an 
interdependent effort. 101 
Collaboration is an iterative process.  Participants must build collaborative 
capacity over time by focusing on developing swift trust and being aware of culture 
understanding.  Participants must also use face-to-face contact at the initial meeting.  
After swift trust is established, participants can use media of decreasing richness over 
time, but should schedule face-to-face meetings to ensure collaboration is maintained.  
For example, individuals may meet face-to-face and may exchange cell phone numbers 
or an email address.  Then, the individuals may use these lesser rich media to collaborate.  
Over time, the individuals may introduce one another to a collaborative website or 
application where it is easier to communicate with one another asynchronously or 
synchronously.  File sharing, including video, maps, audio, or video-teleconferencing 
could occur if the parties felt a need to execute those activities.  Furthermore, the 
telecommunication infrastructure must be able to provide the necessary bandwidth to 
support the participant’s needs.  Figure 1 depicts this iterative process.   
                                                 
100 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacities: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Innovations through Collaboration, Advances in 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams 12 (2006): 272. 
101 Christopher D. Bertram, “Factors that Affect Interagency Collaborations: Lessons During and 
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Figure 1. Framework for Collaboration 
 
There are several assumptions the author has made regarding the framework for 
collaboration.  First, the policies or orders of both the military and the NGOs allow for 
collaboration, contact, and information sharing.  Second, each group has had some 
training in civil-military operations.  Third, both groups also have a “felt need” to 
collaborate.  Fourth, the security situation is not severely degraded due to armed militias, 
terrorist cells, or insurgent groups such as in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Finally, the 
environment and context of the situation is a humanitarian aid or disaster relief situation.  
Participants may use the framework to collaborate.  The author now discusses the 
iterative collaboration process. 
1. Trust and Cultural Understanding 
Trust is the foundation where collaboration is constructed.  Trust is a critical 
component to collaborating with individuals and groups, especially those outside an 
individual’s home organization.  The findings of this thesis reinforce the need for trust in 
individual and group collaboration.  This is particularly true in horizontal relationships 
between peer-type organizations.   
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An impediment to civil-military cooperation stems from the mutual lack of 
familiarity and is compounded by the fact that NGOs are suspicious of the military and 
vice versa.  Distrust, language, cultural misunderstanding, a lack of face-to-face contact 
and organizational bias all impact social collaboration.  There is ignorance of the other’s 
organization including their organizational structure and capabilities.  Each group also 
may have inherent mistrust that stems from very different institutional cultures. 102  
Organizational misunderstanding and a lack of respect for the policies for the group also 
negatively impacts the collaboration between groups.  If individuals and groups do not 
have relationships developed and honed over time, collaborative capacity is impacted.  
Rui Lopes of Save the Children stated that military personnel cannot come into Save the 
Children compounds with weapons, body armor, and uniforms.  He would prefer to have 
the military personnel specially trained in civil-military relations to meet with security 
coordinators at a neutral site or with the military person in civilian clothes.  Additional 
social barriers to collaboration include: soldiers respond to clear lines of command, sets 
of rules, and operational orders, aid workers are less generally independent minded and 
retain considerable decision making power at field level. 103 
2. Mechanisms of Communication 
Face-to-face contact is crucial to enhancing collaborative capacity.  Individuals 
build trust through face-to-face contacts which can translate to more frequent contact 
using other less personal or social modes of communication.  Once face-to-face contact is 
executed, participants may use media of decreasing richness in order to enhance 
efficiency and maximize their joint optimization.  They can use cellular phones, the 
internet, chat, and other communications methods to expand the geographic span of 
control to help more people. 
 
                                                 
102 Francis Kofi Abiew, “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 
10, no. 1, (Spring 2003): 30. 
103 Ibid. 
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Today's emergency responders can no more dispense with mobile phones or 
electronically transmitted spreadsheets than a global courier company can. Mobile 
phones increase the flow of information, and the speed at which it can be processed, in a 
world where information used to be confused or absent.104  Toby Porter, emergencies 
director of Save the Children, adds that mobile phones can facilitate relations between aid 
agencies and local governments. 105  “In the humanitarian operation of the future,” says 
Porter, “beneficiaries of emergency aid will use technology to tell us what they need—
cash, food, or education…” 106 Linder states “The ultimate goal of enhanced connectivity 
is to enable local populations to prevent and mitigate conflict, and help rebuild their 
country.” 107 
Limited or no internet connectivity, sporadic or nonexistent cellular service, lack 
of power, and even bad transportation infrastructure make connecting on very basic 
levels impossible. Inefficient communication infrastructure can mean that something as 
simple as sending an email or setting up a meeting can prove extremely time 
consuming.108  Bandwidth can be so limited as to be almost unusable; cellular service is 
uneven; and many headquarters staff relies heavily on internet-based information and by 
doing so, exclude colleagues working in more remote areas.  Incompatible radio systems, 
for instance, make civilian-to-military and even military-to-military communications 
difficult. 109  
 
                                                 




107 Rebecca Linder, “Wikis, Webs, and Networks:  Creating Connections for Conflict- Prone-
Settings,”  (Oct 15 2006)    http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061018_pcr_creatingconnections.pdf. 
108 Ibid., 10. 
109 Ibid., 11. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Participants must understand there are multiple factors that impact the 
collaborative capacity of groups in HADR operations.  The author now provides several 
recommendations that participants may utilize to enhance collaboration and cooperation 
before a crisis.   
1. Exercises, Training, and Conferences 
Groups should become more familiar with one another face-to-face through 
exercises or conferences in non-crisis situations.  Training should include cultural 
awareness, the importance of trust, and how one can adeptly choose the most appropriate 
communication method. The United Nations has developed a Civil Military 
Coordinator’s course that introduces each respective group to one another.  The author 
interviewed an extremely experienced Civil-Military Liaison Officer of the United 
Nations who has deployed to nearly every major catastrophe since the early 1990s.  The 
author asked: “How did he contact the individual or group?”  He replied, “Through 
established networks, which are a result of many years of hard work. Our team has some 
1900 graduates of the United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Training Program 
(UN-CMCOORD). These people are reliable partners in every emergency response 
operation.”  Training exercises, conferences, and informal meetings give groups an 
understanding of each party’s policies, culture, and capabilities.  This interaction allows 
military,  civil-military experts and NGO liaison officers an appreciation of one another’s 
organizational culture and structure.   
2. Policies, Orders, and Felt Need 
By using the model identified in Figure 1, participants must understand the need 
for supportive policies and feel a need to collaborate.  Department of Defense policies 
and orders can provide a framework to establish how personnel collaborate in HADR 
environments.  However, aid groups who are willing to collaborate must also establish 
policies or mandates that provide parameters for their members.  By formalizing the 
process of collaboration, individual actors may be more frank with one another and 
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develop trust sooner to speed the collaboration process.  Finally, individuals and groups 
must see value in collaborating with one another.  Groups work with one another if there 
is a felt need for collaboration.   
3. Virtual Environment and Social Networking 
Once individual participants meet face-to-face in a rich media environment, if 
they choose to do so, they may exchange contact information.  This contact information 
may include less rich media such as a cellular or telephone number, a Skype username, or 
an email address.  If the participants see the value of collaborating virtually, they may 
choose to meet in a community of interest website or in a virtual collaborative 
environment.  These virtual meetings could include an occasional email or a link on an 
individual’s MySpace or Facebook homepage.  The proliferation of social networking 
websites provides an effective mechanism for individuals to maintain contact with one 
another who may be separated by distance or culture. 
4. Brokers 
Another approach to communications is through brokers.  Brokers can be used 
from impartial organizations to serve as bridges between groups.  Officers from the 
United Nations or USAID can serve as brokers and coordinate and deconflict operational 
requirements between military and civilian aid providers.   
C. HYPOTHETICAL RESULTS OF SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION 
Humanitarian aid and disaster relief actors need to come to an understanding that 
some NGOs work with the military and some will not.  Military forces must respect NGO 
needs for independence, neutrality, transparency, and impartiality.  However, when actors 
can come to an agreement regarding contact within these environments the sum of their 
efforts will be greater than their individual contributions.   
The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee recognizes this crucial 
need.  It has stated in its Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex 
Emergencies states, “Engaging military support for humanitarian operations is not a new 
endeavor. In today’s security environment, however, the military are ever more involved 
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in the ‘direct’ provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations 
where there are no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a last resort, for safety and 
to access populations in need - at the serious risk of compromising their neutrality, 
impartiality, and/or independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.”  
John Holmes, the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator stated, “In today’s reality, aid workers and soldiers at 
times have little choice but to re-explore their relationship and improvise best ways 
possible for some degree of potential interaction, while simultaneously responding to the 
emergency at hand.”  There will be groups who will not work with the military, other 
NGOs, or IGOs.  There may also be groups that collocate themselves with military forces 
in order to get the aid to the people as quickly and as efficiently as possible.  Given their 
overarching shared purpose, all actors must respect the goals of each group.  Figure 2 
provides a graphical depiction of the results of collaboration.  Included are collaborative 
groups and groups and individual components that do not share information as readily 
with other elements in the operation.   
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Figure 2. Results of Successful Collaboration 
 
D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Natural and man-made disasters are always a constant threat.  During a crisis 
situation, groups from around the world will come to the aid of the people in need.  
However, this thesis only focused on specific enablers and barriers to collaboration 
relating to trust, culture, ICT, and face-to-face contact.  There are still many areas of 
research that can be explored.  Website design and virtual social networking between 
participants could be analyzed.  Power in austere environments is critical to supporting 
ICT infrastructure.  Hastily Formed Networks, developed by the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Cebrowski Institute, are a key component to enhancing collaboration focusing 
on wireless networking.  Another aspect of research would be analyzing the ICT 
connective points of a network organization coupled with virtual social networking. 
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Finally, another area of study could be the propensity to use face-to-face contact for 
horizontal communication, between organizations, and email and collaborative software 
for vertical communication within the same organization.  
E. CONCLUSION 
On 2 May 2008, as the author neared completion of the thesis study, Cyclone 
Nargis hit Myanmar.  The international aid community is attempting to gain access to the 
devastated areas.  A Red Cross press release stated, “The Myanmar Red Cross and the 
International Federation works closely with government officials, sharing information as 
it comes in, gradually forming a picture of the myriad needs in this devastation and 
highly-complex natural disaster. Many, many thousands of people are homeless and are 
living in pitiable conditions.” 110  The Myanmar government has said 22,000 people were 
killed. The top U.S. envoy in the country has said the death toll may be as high as 
100,000. 111  The international community is currently preparing to engage in a massive 
aid effort.  ICT, trust, culture, and face-to-face contact will be necessary enablers of 
collaboration.  However, Myanmar’s telecommunications infrastructure will have a 
massive impact on the aid effort.  If the infrastructure has been damaged, aid distribution 
will be slowed, duplication of efforts can increase, and aid assessments may take longer 
to process and share between aid actors. 
Virtual collaborative networks may be able to enhance efficiency and the 
capability of all aid groups, but participants must understand the value of collaborating 
with other groups.  If there is not a propensity to collaborate, organizations will 
stovepipe.  Aid groups can alleviate suffering of the population, but the sheer scale of the 
emergency will overwhelm the government’s capabilities to care for its own people.   
 
                                                 
110 Joe Lowry, “Aid Moving Out In Myanmar But More Needed,” ReliefWeb, (May 9 2008), 
www.reliefweb.int. 
111 Dan Rivers, “Behind the Scenes: Escaping Cyclone-Ravaged Myanmar,” Cable News Network, 
(May 9 2008), www.cnn.com. 
  47
This thesis was written to understand what components are necessary to enhance 
collaborative capacity between humanitarian aid organizations.  Collaborative enablers, 
cultural understanding, face-to-face contact, and ICT, are all necessary elements to share 
information.  Conversely, actors must be aware of the barriers to collaboration including 
cultural misunderstanding and technical challenges associated with ICT.  Once the actors 
understand what necessary components to collaboration are, they can also mitigate the 
challenges to collaboration.   
Unfortunately, as the devastation of Cyclone Nargis has demonstrated, natural and 
man-made disasters are a constant threat to the most vulnerable populations.  The catalyst 
of a natural disaster creates a compelling need for people and organizations to come 
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Background: There are many reasons for civilian organizations to collaborate with 
military organizations and vice versa.   
 
The objective of this interview is to explore attitudes toward community of interest (COI) 
websites that are designed to enhance collaboration between groups during humanitarian 
aid and disaster relief operations. 
 
What you will say will be confidential. 
 
Please think of a time when you had to interact with a member of the US Military or an 
NGO. 
 
Part 1: Determining an interviewee’s experience and familiarity with community of 
interest websites and collaboration. 
1. Have you been involved in a humanitarian aid operation? 
a. What disaster, where, when?How long were you there? 
b. Did you interact with an military member/NGO during the event? 
c. Why? 
d. How did you contact the individual or group? 
e. How did you interact with the other group? 
2. Are you aware of any websites used to create a community of interest or assist 
communications between organizations during a HADR operation? 
a. Which ones? 
b. How useful was the website? 
c. What capabilities did the website have? 
d. Did you use the website’s tools i.e. hanging files, chat, video, etc.? 
e. What was your overall impression of the utility of the site? 
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f. Do you belong to any websites?   
g. Which ones? 
h. Do you feel that community of interest (COI) websites are a valuable 
tool to share information in order to build collaborative capacity and 
increase efficiency? 
3. The Department of Defense has developed www.shareinfoforpeople.org. 
a. Have you heard of it? 
b. If yes, why and in what context did you use the website, i.e. historical 
reference, GIS, discussion threads, etc. 
c. What do you think of the idea? 
d. Did you know that DoD sponsored the website? 
e. Would you contribute to the website? 
f. Who are the potential users of the site? 
g. How do you choose which entity to share information? 
4. The United Nations has developed www.reliefweb.int and 
http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc 
a. Have you heard of it? 
b. If yes, why and in what context did you use the website, i.e. historical 
reference, GIS, discussion threads, etc. 
c. What do you think of the idea? 
d. Did you know that the UN sponsored the website? 
e. Would you contribute to the website? 
f. Who are the potential users of the site? 
g. How do you choose which entity to share information? 
5. What are the primary modes of information sharing that you use? 
a. Email? 
b. Fax & telephonics? 
c. Collaborative website? 




f. Do these websites ask…”what can they do for you?” 
Part 2:  Examining the culture and propensity to share information between NGOs 
and military personnel. 
Are there rewards and incentives to collaborate military or NGO groups? 
1. Are there other lateral mechanisms via face to face coordination i.e. liaison 
personnel established in order to ensure collaboration and harmonize 
operations? 
a. Are these preferred to virtual collaboration? 
b. Did geographic separation impact communication between groups? 
c. Did reliable communications including power available impact 
communicative capabilities? 
2. Is there organizational distrust between groups?112 
a. Is there a perceived level of incompetency between groups? 
b. Is there animosity or arrogance between groups? 
c. Is there an appreciation for the others’ perspectives. 
3. Are there barriers to collaboration in virtual information and work groups? 
a. Is funding affected by media coverage? 
b. Competition for resources in a flash funding appeal through the UN 
4. Are there restrictions to collaborating with NGOs/military personnel? 
a. For example the ICRC forbids contact with military personnel. 
5. If you have collaborated with Mil/NGO, what were the results of the 
collaboration? 
6. What are the cultural barriers to collaboration? 
a. Security 
b. “Aiding the enemy” 
 
7. How do you develop trust in HADR operations? 
                                                 
112 Susan Page-Hocevar, Gail Fann-Thomas, and Erik Jansen.  2006.  Building Collaborative 
Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness. Innovation Through Collaboration: 
Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Volume 12, Elsevier Ltd.  255–274. 260. 
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8. Is there an individual in your organization whose focus is communications? 
a. In a NGO cluster or military logistics area or CMOC, there are 
individuals whose sole focus is on communications…did they use 
collaborative software? 
9. What would you tell another peer within your group or an outside group about 
www.reliefweb.int or www.shareinfoforpeople.org 
 
Part 3:  Looking at the websites through a marketing lens in order to determine if 
there are any identifiable characteristics that would lead to greater collaboration. 
1. Imagine the website could speak, what would it say about itself? 
2. What does the product need to be successful? 
3. Can you name five positive characteristics about the website that you have 
used in the past?  Or are there positive characteristics about collaborating with 
NGOs or military personnel? 
4. If you were responsible for marketing one of the two websites, what 
persuasive arguments would you use in talking to NGO or military personnel? 
5. Is the leadership or management of your group supportive or committed to 
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